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by the legislature must not be arbitrary and unreasonable; they
must have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life.I
It is doubtful, therefore, if the mere non-payment of wages could
be declared presumptive evidence of fraud. One court, however,
held that a wilful refusal to pay, when the employer had the
ability to pay, was fraudulent in itself and therefore within the
the fraud exception to the prohibition on imprisonment for debt.1"
Semi-monthly payday laws are constitutional unless they vio-
late a constitutional restriction against imprisonment for debt.
Such constitutional restrictions are violated only by statutes
imposing criminal sanctions, either fines or imprisonment, on
non-corporate offenders for the non-fraudulent non-payment of
wages.19 Presumably, even this type of statute does not violate
the constitutional restriction in those states which require that
the debtor transfer all his property to his creditors, except in
the case of an employer who is in fact insolvent. The amount
of legislation on this subject indicates that many legislatures
feel that regular, short-term, cash payments to employees are
necessary to the well-being of the society. The liberty of the
citizen, however, is much prized in our society, and the bar on
criminal sanctions to enforce semi-monthly payday laws in the
individual employer situation seems highly desirable.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SCOPE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
Defendant, a Mexican, claimed that he was denied equal pro-
tection of the law in his trial and conviction for murder because
members of his nationality had been systematically and wilfully
excluded from the grand and petit juries before which his cause
was heard. Evidence that there were some Mexicans qualified
for jury service but that none had been called for twenty-five
years was heard, but there was no direct testimony showing dis-
crimination by the state officers. Defendant's motion to have the
17. Tot v. United States 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Taylor v. Georgia, 315
U.S. 25 (1941); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
18. Ex parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193 P.2d 734 (1948) (even though
the element of deception, usually essential to fraud, is absent).
19. In re Crane, 26 Cal. App. 22, 145 Pac. 733 (1914) ; State v. Prudential
Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S.W. 56 (1914) ; accord, McGinnis v. Keen, 189
Ore. 445, 221 P.2d 907 (1950).
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indictment and petit jury panel quashed on this evidence was
overruled by the trial court. On appeal, held: affirmed. The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' is directed at
discrimination only as between two classes: the white and Negro
races. Since defendant is a white man of Spanish descent and
since there were white jurors in his case, it cannot be said, in the
absence of direct evidence of discrimination by the state officers,
that defendant was denied the equal protection of the laws.'
In a series of cases beginning in 1879, the Supreme Court of
the United States has clearly established the principle that any
action by a state in a criminal proceeding that tends to exclude
systematically Negroes from serving on grand or petit juries
solely because of their race constitutes a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
This principle has been applied to invalidate not only state laws
expressly excluding Negroes from jury service4 but also any
discriminatory action by a state official in the selection of jurors.'
On the other hand, the constitutional prohibition has never been
construed to say that any defendant is entitled to have a member
of his own race on the jury-either absolutely, or in any propor-
tion to population.' Furthermore, it has been held that neither
are the constitutional rights of a white defendant infringed by
the systematic exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries7
nor are those of a Negro defendant invaded by the peremptory
discharge of Negro jurors by the state.8
1. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 1: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
2. Hernandes v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crin. 1952).
3. E.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 463 (1947) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) ; Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
4. Neal v. Delaware, supra note 3; Strauder v. West Virginia, supra
note 3.
5. Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463 (1947); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1938); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935).
6. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ; Adkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 806 (1945); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879) ; Washington v. State, 95 Fla. 289, 116 So. 470, cert. denied, 278
U.S. 599 (1928); King v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 27, 152 S.W.2d 342 (1941).
7. State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938).
8. People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.W.2d 466 (1943), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944); State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256
(1939).
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Concerning the procedural application of the above principle,
it is settled that the accused must be given an opportunity to
introduce evidence to show discriminatory exclusion," but this
opportunity has been limited to the extent that any objection
based on alleged discrimination may be considered waived if made
at an inappropriate time.10 The burden is on the defendant to
aver and prove deliberate exclusion of Negroes in the selection of
the jury,"' and the defendant's cause in this request was mate-
rially aided by the United States Supreme Court's announcement
in Noris v. Albam 1 2 of the so-called rule of exclusion. This
rule says that evidence of continuous absence of Negroes from
grand and petit juries, when there are qualified Negroes avail-
able, establishes a presumption of discriminatory exclusion re-
buttable only by an affirmative showing by the state that exclu-
sion was a result of lack of qualifications prescribed for jurors
by statute.
13
The Fourteenth Amendment was originally adopted for the
protection of Negroes but its provisions are broad enough to
include any race or group.'14 In addition, certain courts, including
the court in the principal case, have intimated that direct proof
of discriminatory actions by state officers against other than
Negro defendants would amount to a denial of equal protection
9. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
10. Motion in arrest of judgment based upon the equal protection clause
comes too late if made after conviction. Cornelious v. State, 193 Ga. 25,
17 S.E.2d 156 (1941); State v. White, 193 La. 775, 192 So. 345 (1939);
Mitchell v. State, 59 Okla. Crim. 345, 60 P.2d 631 (1936); Watts v. State,
75 Tex. Crim. 330, 171 S.W. 202 (1914).
11. Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910); Brownfield v.
South Carolina,' 189 U.S. 426 (1903); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110
(1882); State v. Gill, 186 La. 339, 172 So. 412, cert. denied, Gill v. Louisiana,
301 U.S. 685 (1937) ; Whitney v. State, 43 Tex. Crin. 197, 63 S.W. 879 (1901).
12. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
13. In the following cases it was held, in line with the Norris case, that
defendant had satisfied the burden: Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950)(jury commissioners testified that they chose only those whom they knew
for jury service and that they knew no eligible Negroes, where Negro popu-
lation was about one-seventh of the county population); Patton v. Missis-
sippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (evidence by the state that only twenty-five of
the 12,511 Negroes in a county with a population of 34,821 were qualified
was insufficient to rebut presumption of discrimination where no Negro had
served on a criminal jury for thirty years); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S.
354 (1939) (prima facie case created when only one Negro was selected for
jury service within the memory of witnesses and there was a large Negro
population); Gilchrist v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 230, 223 S.W.2d 880
(1949) (no Negro called for state jury service for twenty-seven years and
some had served on federal court juries).
14. See note 1 supra.
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of the law.'5 The United States Supreme Court, moreover, has
left the door open for the consideration of charges of discrimina-
tion that fall without the race and color category.16 These con-
siderations would appear to be grounds for an argument that,
with the rule of exclusion now the law, it should be extended to
cover other social groups subject to possible discrimination.
Pointing in the same direction are the indications given by the
federal courts in their construction of the federal naturalization
statutes that a Mexican is in a different racial classification from
that of the white man.' 7 If such is the case, then the position of
the defendant in the principal case and that of the Negro in
Norris v. Alabama are closely analogous.
These factors are grounds for questioning the court's refusal
in the principal case to extend the rule of the Norris case beyond
its precise facts. There seems to be little reason why that rule
should not be available to members of races, nationalities, or
other social groups whose standing in a particular case is very
similar to that of the Negro.
COURTS - OPERATION OF OVERRULING DECISIONS
Plaintiff purchased a truck at a stated cash price of $1,750,
giving in payment a note for $1,439.14, cash in the amount of
$100, and his car in trade valued at $500. The increase of $289.14
above the stated cash price was to be for insurance, interest and
service charges. The seller assigned the conditional sales con-
tract, made upon the forms of the defendant, to the defendant
for $1,150. The insurance was $148.24, leaving $140.90 as in-
terest and service charges. The plaintiff filed suit alleging usury
15. Mamaux v. United States, 264 Fed. 816 (6th Cir. 1920) (wage-
earners) ; State v. Walters, 61 Idaho 341, 102 P.2d 284 (1940) (one-quarter
blood Indian); State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922) (Italian) ;
Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 436, 181 S.W.2d 87 (1944) (Mexican);
Carrasco v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 659, 95 S.W.2d 433 (1936) (Mexican);
Ramirez v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 362, 40 S.W.2d 138, cert. denied, 284 U.S.
659 (1931) (Mexican). The same indication was given in the principal case.
16. In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 283, r'ehearing denied, 332 U.S.
784 (1947), the Court said:
We do not mean that no case of discrimination in jury drawing
except those involving race or color can carry such unjust consequences
as to amount to a denial of equal protection or due process of law.
17. Ex parte Shahid, 205 Fed. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1913); In Te Rodriguez,
81 Fed. 337 (N.D. Tex. 1897).
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